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By Neil Boister∗ 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the evolution of the doctrine of conspiracy during the course of the 
trial at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter the Tokyo Trial). 
The Tokyo Trial is a neglected foundation of international criminal law, long in the 
shadow of Nuremberg, condemned as victor’s justice because of the prosecution of 
Japanese war time leaders for crimes against peace. Professor Cherif Bassiouni’s 
comment is typical: 
 
Tokyo...was a precedent that legal history can only consider with a view not to 
repeat it.1 
 
Bassiouni’s comment, however, is an invitation not to ignore the trial but to learn from its 
mistakes. The trial’s treatment of conspiracy is particularly relevant today because 
conspiracy was intimately linked to the crime of aggression at Tokyo, and aggression is 
part of the substantive jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
 
 
2. The Background to the Trial 
The first step towards punishing Japanese aggression was taken when the leaders of the 
US, China, and Great Britain adopted the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945 (later 
adhered to by the USSR).2 It provides in Principle 10: 
 
We do not intend that the Japanese people shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed 
as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including 
those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. 3 
 
In the Instrument of Surrender4 signed on 2 September 1945, the Japanese Government 
undertook to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to 
issue whatever orders the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, General Douglas 
Macarthur, required in order to give effect to the Declaration. 5 
On 6 October 1945 the US State War Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC), 
largely responsible for US policy on Japan, directed MacArthur to arrange the trial of 
major Japanese war criminals6 for inter alia the 
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[p]lanning, preparation, initiating, or waging of a war of aggression in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.7  
 
Without receiving express direction from the by then operative Far Eastern Commission 
(FEC), the Allied policy control group for Japan, on 19 January 1946, MacArthur by 
special proclamation established an ‘International Military Tribunal for the Far East’ for 
the purpose of   
 
the trial of those persons charged individually or as members of organizations or 
in both capacities with offences which include crimes against peace.8  
 
The Tribunal’s Charter declared that the Tribunal was  
 
established for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals in the far East.9  
 
These major war criminals faced eleven judges from eleven allies involved in the war in 
the Pacific: the President Sir William Webb (Australia), McDougall (Canada), Mei 
(China), Bernard (France), Jaranilla (Philippines), Röling (Netherlands), Northcroft (New 
Zealand), Zaryanov (USSR), Lord Patrick (UK), Pal (India) and Higgins (US) (later 
replaced by Cramer). 
 
 
3. Conspiracy: The Conceptual Background 
The idea of prosecuting Axis war-time leaders with ‘crimes against peace’ for starting the 
Second World War emerged fairly late in the war. The Allies initial focus had been 
entirely on responsibility for atrocities against civilians and Prisoners of War.  
The first difficulty with the notion of crimes against peace was the concept of 
criminal liability itself for the breach of prohibitions against the use of force by states.  
William C. Chanler,10 a former Wall Street lawyer in Henry Stimson’s US War 
Department, argued that the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which prohibited war ‘as an 
instrument of national policy’, had changed the legal position of individuals who if they 
engaged in an unlawful war lost the protection of the ius in bello and became unlawful 
belligerents, open to prosecution for common offences such as murder.. 
 The second difficulty was reaching the ‘big fish’ – the Axis leaders. The legal 
principles chosen for this purpose was conspiracy. Based on a simple agreement to 
commit crime or tort, conspiracy, a doctrine of English criminal law, it had spread 
through the common law world because it could be used against those who plot behind 
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the scenes.11 US Department of Justice lawyer Murray Bernays argued that violations of 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact although perhaps not criminal could nevertheless be construed 
as the object of a criminal conspiracy along with murder and other crimes.12 He argued 
that once the conspiracy was established each act of every member of the conspiracy 
would be imputable to all the other members.13  
 The synthesis of Chanler’s and Bernay’s theses, which became in effect the US 
position, rendered agreement to engage in an unlawful war a crime and linked those who 
engaged in an unlawful war with responsibility for all consequential harm, stripping them 
of any protections under the laws of war. This is a view with striking parallels to the 
current US position in the war on terror – the imposition of collective guilt and the 
removal of international legal protections. 
 
 
4. Conspiracy: The Legislative Background 
At the London Conference which established the Nuremberg IMT, the US attempted to 
include conspiracy as a stand alone crime, separate from, preceding and encompassing 
the preparation for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
However, the French resisted; for them conspiracy was a barbarous legal mechanism 
used to punish people collectively.14 In the final compromise conspiracy lost the stand 
alone status it had enjoyed in the US drafts and was linked in Article 6 of the Nuremberg 
Charter only to crimes against peace.15 But a stand alone paragraph relating to complicity 
but having some bearing on conspiracy, was retained at the end of Article 6. 
The drafting history of this paragraph is worthy of closer examination. In an early 
draft of the Charter the general conspiracy crime was included in draft article 6(d).16 A 
separate draft Article 9 provided that ‘organizers, instigators and accomplices who 
participate in the formulation or execution of a common criminal plan or in the 
perpetration of individual crimes are equally responsible with all other participants in the 
crimes.’ This dual structure was followed until a US suggestion limited conspiracy to 
aggression.17 However, it included a final paragraph in draft Article 6 which read: 
‘Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
instigation of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are 
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in furtherance of such plan.’18 On the 
final day of discussion Conference Chair Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe recognised that ‘[t]his 
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concluding paragraph would take the place of [draft] Article 9’19 even though it went 
further in that it provided that the accused were not merely equally responsible but 
explicitly that they were responsible for the acts of others. US delegate Justice Robert H 
Jackson’s response was that this was necessary ‘in order to reach some of these things’.  
It appears that when the US plan for an over-arching conspiracy was slowly restricted, 
the US beefed up the complicity provision to ensure Charter contained the rule that 
participation in the conspiracy lead to responsibility for all of the executed offences. 
 At Nuremberg the US prosecutors tried to revive their idea by charging a grand 
conspiracy in Count 1, but the IMT responded negatively,20 abandoning the grand 
conspiracy for many smaller conspiracies, applying conspiracy only to crimes against 
peace and not war crimes or crimes against humanity, and adopting a restrictive view of 
the elements of the inchoate offence.21 The Tribunal’s conservative approach resulted in 
only eight of the twenty two accused being convicted on the conspiracy count.  
 
 
5. Conspiracy in the Tokyo Charter 
The Tokyo Charter provides in Article 5 (an almost exact copy of Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter): 
 
Article 5: Jurisdiction over Persons and Offenses. The Tribunal shall have the power to 
try and punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of 
organizations are charged with offenses which include crimes against peace. The 
following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
for which there shall be individual responsibility: 
a. Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
b. Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws and customs of war; 
c. Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane act committed before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices 
participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all the acts performed by 
any person in execution of such plan.  
 
Those parts in bold italics relate directly to conspiracy. Three aspects of the Charter are 
worth noting in this regard: 
• The Charter makes it clear that any person indicted would have to be charged with 
crimes against peace. 
• Article 5(a) includes as one of the crimes against peace ‘a common plan of 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing’.  
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• Article 5(c) has an extra sentence which provides on its face that leaders and so 
forth participating in the formulation of a common plan or conspiracy are 
responsible for all the acts performed by any person in execution of the plan.  
 
 
6. The Tokyo Indictment 
The punishment of the persons responsible for wars of aggression became the most 
important objective of the Tokyo trial.22 The 36 counts of crimes against peace or Class A 
offences, laid against the 28 Class A accused who were variously civil and military 
leaders through the period of Japan’s expansionism, were designed to achieve this result. 
Two charges were used in the thirty-six counts: conspiracy to commit aggression, and 
aggression itself, which included planning, preparing, initiating or waging war.  
 The conspiracy charges (Counts 1-5) related to specific historical events. Count 1 
began: 
 
All of the Defendants together with divers other persons, between the 1st January, 
1928, and the 2nd September, 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, 
or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy, 
and are responsible for all the acts performed by themselves or by any person in 
execution of such plan.23 
 
Count 1 went on to outline a broad conspiracy over eighteen years with the objective of 
securing ‘the military, naval, political, and economic domination of East Asia and of the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans, and of all countries and islands therein and bordering 
thereon….’. 24 In the other counts the grand conspiracy was broken down into its 
constituent parts to avoid the possibility of acquittal because Count 1 stated the grand 
conspiracy too broadly. Elsewhere in the Indictment conspiracy was used in one of the 
three counts for war crimes/crimes against humanity (Class B and C crimes) and in three 
counts of ‘murder’, even though the latter had no basis in the Charter or international law. 
 The Indictment’s use of conspiracy reflects the US policy of total collective 
responsibility for all harm attaching to those who conspire to start illegal wars – 
responsibility for starting the war, for breaches of the ius in bello that followed and for 
breaches of domestic criminal laws of the states invaded. 
 
  
7. The Prosecution’s Shifting Use of Conspiracy 
The prosecution’s use of conspiracy at Tokyo was divided into two phases. In the 
opening phase the prosecution concentrated on establishing the conspiracy’s validity as a 
crime in international law and the legitimacy of its use in protecting international peace 
and security.25 Drawing on US authority for definitional purposes, they argued that 
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conspiracy was the result of an agreement, not the agreement itself, and thus the existence 
of a formal agreement was unnecessary. The agreement could be established by ‘a 
concert of action, all the parties working together understandingly, with a single design 
for the accomplishment of a common purpose’. Any Japanese leader who joined in was 
guilty even though he did not authorize or actually participate in the preparation of the 
ultimate unlawful act, as long as he failed expressly to withdraw from the evil 
combination.  
 However, on summation, the prosecution responded to Nuremberg’s restriction of 
conspiracy to crimes against peace and rejection of the idea of a grand conspiracy in 
Europe, by running an argument entitled ‘The Law of Conspiracy and Cognate 
Doctrines’.26  They submitted that the final sentence of Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter did 
not provide for an offence but for a form of ‘common responsibility for those engaged in 
a common plan’.27 They argued the doctrine had two important elements, recognised by 
most states and thus general principles of international law: (i) A joint offender or 
accessory before the fact could be tried and convicted as a principal; and (ii) any person 
who joined in the conspiracy at any time was, from that moment until the end, 
responsible for all acts and words of his fellow conspirators.28 Thus a conspirator would 
be guilty of the various substantive counts – planning, preparing, initiating and waging 
specific aggressive wars – even without evidence of direct participation.29 The accused 
was responsible unless he made an ‘affirmative act of withdrawal’.30 Objecting but 
allowing oneself to be overruled did not amount to withdrawal, and nor did differences of 
opinion as to the direction of aggression and tactics, geographical distance, hierarchical 
distinction, and lack of knowledge of all the co-conspirators. Only resignation in protest 
at the particular decision constituted effective withdrawal.31 The defence was alive to 
what was at stake. They responded that this doctrine of ‘criminal implied agency’ was 
like conspiracy peculiar to Anglo-American law and not a general principle of 
international law.32  
 This ‘cognate doctrine’ resembles the ‘Pinkerton conspiracy’ doctrine of US law33 
and the English ‘joint enterprise’ or Australian ‘common purpose’ doctrines in that all 
parties to the common purpose are liable for the offences jointly contemplated. It is 
probably more akin to the latter, however, as in Pinkerton conspiracy provides for 
liability for crimes committed in furtherance of the agreement on a simple negligence 
standard34 while the prosecution at Tokyo like the English and Australian doctrine 
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appeared to insist on a subjective state of mind for such liability.35 Moreover, Pinkerton 
conspiracy provides that anyone who joins a conspiracy is responsible for any act of a co-
conspirator whether committed before or after he joined the common enterprise, whereas 
the prosecution at Tokyo took the English law position that the accused is only liable for 
those acts committed after he or she become a participant.36   
The final sentence of Article 5 suggests that the authors of the Tokyo Charter did 
provide for a separate basis for responsibility for substantive offences, even though this 
did not reflect the then current international law. It was an open question as to how the 
Tribunal would respond: 
• Would it convict for inchoate conspiracy to commit crimes against peace? 
• Would it rely on the joint enterprise doctrine to convict the accused of the choate 
offences of initiating and waging war, and perhaps also of crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and murder?  
 
 
8. Lord Patrick’s draft opinion 
On 30 January 1948, the British member of the Tribunal, Lord Patrick, circulated among 
the members of the Tribunal a paper entitled “Planning” and “Conspiracy” in Relation 
to Criminal Trials, and Specially in Relation to the Trial.37 In his view the common law 
tradition contained two kinds of conspiracy: the ‘naked’ conspiracy, the conspiracy to 
commit a crime never in fact committed; and the ‘executed’ conspiracy, where the 
accused was convicted not of conspiring to commit the crime but of the actual crime.  
 When referring to the ‘executed conspiracy’ Patrick described the “basic” joint 
enterprise doctrine – all are responsible for every unlawful act falling within the common 
purpose. Patrick distinguished the “parasitical” version of the doctrine, where something 
unlawful occurs which is incidental to, but not part of, the common purpose, but for 
which the accused are responsible if they foresaw it. This was in his view a special 
feature of English law and not of concern to the Tribunal because no count of the 
Indictment charged that in the execution of planned crimes some other and different 
crime was committed.38 But it was clear that in every count of the Indictment which 
alleged conspiracy it was also alleged that the conspiracy was executed. Thus in Count I 
it is charged that “All the defendants participated … in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy” to commit what is alleged to be a crime. All counts charged 
execution of the conspiracies, and in his view if both planning and execution of the plans 
was proved, both planners and executants would be liable as participators.39 It appears 
that the prosecution argument for joint enterprise liability had not fallen on deaf ears.  
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 Lord Patrick thought it was open to convict, in addition, on the basis of ‘naked’ 
conspiracy because all counts alleged both formulation and execution of alleged crimes. 
The ‘naked’ conspiracy would not have to be merged into the executed crimes. However, 
like Nuremberg, he also rejected the counts of ‘naked’ conspiracy to commit war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.40 In his view Article 5(a) was an exact description of a 
“naked” conspiracy.41 The final sentence of Article 5 on the other hand referred to 
‘formulation or execution’ and had no application whatever to a “naked” conspiracy, for 
in a “naked” conspiracy there has been no execution of the crime. He concluded that as 
many systems of law did not recognise a “naked” conspiracy as a crime, under the 
Charter a “naked” conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity was not a 
crime.42 
 
9. President William Webb’s view 
In his draft judgment the President, William Webb, challenged Patrick’s view that there 
was a crime of naked conspiracy even if only limited to crimes against peace: 
 
It may well be that naked conspiracy to have recourse to war or to commit a 
conventional war crime or crime against humanity should be a crime, but this 
Tribunal is not to determine what ought to be but what is the law. Where a crime 
is created by international law, this Tribunal may apply a rule of universal 
application to determine the range of criminal responsibility, but it has no 
authority to create a crime of naked conspiracy based on the Anglo-American 
concept; nor on what it perceives to be a common feature of the crime of 
conspiracy under various national laws. The national laws of many countries treat 
as a crime of naked conspiracy affecting the security of the state but it would be 
nothing short of judicial legislation for this tribunal to declare that there is a crime 
of naked conspiracy for the safety of the international order.43  
 
But in August 1948 he made it clear that while he rejected the naked conspiracy he 
approved the joint enterprise doctrine: 
 
Any of the accused who is found to have participated as leader, organiser, 
instigator or accomplice, in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit a crime against peace is responsible for all acts performed 
in execution of such common plan; in other words if war is waged he is criminally 
responsible and so guilty for waging it. Then I suggest it is sufficient to find him 
guilty of waging the war without specifying the relevant counts of conspiracy, or 
planning and preparation, or of instigating. If the majority think that the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction extends to conspiracies not followed by war then it will 
hold the Charter is something more than the expression of international law. 
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International law goes no further than the Pact of Paris as regards crimes against 
peace, and the Pact of Paris only makes recourse to aggressive war criminal. If 
there is no recourse to war there is no crime.44 
 
He carried through his approval of convicting for ‘waging’ war on the basis of common 
purpose into his drafts on individual convictions. For example, he argued that if Accused 
no. 1 was guilty on Count 1 then he would in Webb’s view be responsible for the waging 
of all the wars that took place in pursuit of the conspiracy after he joined it. In his 
separate judgment Webb recognised the validity in international law of the joint 
enterprise doctrine, but did not explore its impact on individual convictions.45 
 
 
10. The Majority Judgment 
In its judgment the Majority of the Tribunal, including Lord Patrick, held that in the 
Charter conspiracy was only a crime in respect of crimes against peace, and thus the 
counts of conspiracy to commit murder and war crimes lay outside the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal.46 But it did uphold the conspiracy charge finding on the facts that a grand 
conspiracy to conquer East Asia and the Pacific alleged by the prosecution had existed. 
The leading American historian of modern Japan, Marius Jansen throws cold water on 
this thesis: 
 
The prosecution charged defendants with carrying out a single, consistent plan of 
aggression that began in 1931, but neither the documentary basis nor the nature of 
Japanese politics, in which the prosecutors were neophytes, supported this.47  
 
However, in what is a largely ignored feature of their judgment, the Majority took 
a further step. After noting that Count 1 alleged both ‘formulation and execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy’,48 the Majority held that ‘[a]ll of those who at any time were 
parties to the criminal conspiracy or who at any time with guilty knowledge played a part 
in its execution are guilty of the charge contained in Count I.’49 In other words, Lord 
Patrick’s two forms of conspiracy, “naked” and “executed”, were both punished by 
findings of guilt of all but three of the accused on Count 1. 
 
 
11. The Judgment’s precedential value in re the joint enterprise doctrine 
The Majority judgment did not approve the ‘parasitical form’ of joint enterprise liability. 
In other words, guilt in respect of war crimes, crimes against humanity and murder was 
not attributed to the accused on the basis of their being party to the common purpose to 
wage a grand war of aggression. This is difficult to understand given that the provision in 
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the final sentence of Article 5 which provided for attribution of liability was not limited 
to crimes against peace – it could be applied to ‘any of the foregoing crimes’ including 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Clark notes that the argument may have had 
troubling implications in that in addition to convictions of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity it could have lead to convictions for murder on the basis of participating in 
aggressive war and thus may have scared the judges off.50  There are two further possible 
reasons. First, the Charter only partly authorised the parasitical form in that the final 
sentence of article 5 only referred to attribution of liability based on the joint enterprise 
for Article 5 crimes, i.e. war crimes and crimes against humanity. Second, and more 
importantly, the prosecution never actually as Lord Patrick pointed out charged the 
parasitical form. Although invited to do so by the drafters of the Charter, the Majority 
was probably wise to stay away from the parasitical form. While it is debateable whether 
those who conspire to wage an unlawful war may be subjectively aware that that war 
might be waged in an unlawful manner, it is unlikely that it will be possible to prove that 
they foresaw the particular atrocity. 
The Majority judgment did, however, accept the “basic form” of joint enterprise 
liability, that being party to a common purpose to wage war would result in the 
imputation of the actual waging of war. But it only did so if this was made specific in the 
charge. It did not clearly accept the extension of this principle, that being party to the 
common purpose alleged in the conspiracy counts also made one liable for all the counts 
of actually waging aggressive war. There is evidence that proof of participation in the 
conspiracy also served to establish mens rea for the actual offence of waging.51 But a 
close examination of the individual verdicts suggests that being party to the common 
purpose was not used to establish the conduct element of waging war when the accused 
did not participate directly in waging war.52 There is a counter-example relating to the 
Nomonhan Incident, a border conflict between the USSSR and Japan in 1939, initiated by 
Japan. Prime Minister Hiranuma and War Minister Itagaki, were found to be party to the 
grand conspiracy.53 Although they had not been aware of the attacks at Nomonhan which 
were initiated by local commanders, they were also found guilty of waging war on the 
USSR on the basis that they had authorised the conflict.54  The individual verdict against 
Itagaki notes he ‘was still war minister during the fighting at Nomonhan’, that against 
Hiranuma only that he was a member of the conspiracy. 55 Fox argues that Itagaki and 
Hiranuma were found ‘guilty by association in spite of the inconclusiveness of the 
evidence against them.’56 This may be read as an unarticulated application of the basic 
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joint enterprise doctrine, where participation in the conspiracy absolved the prosecution 
from responsibility for proving direct involvement in the actual count of waging war.  
Why did the Majority not wholeheartedly embrace the full application of the 
application of the basic form of the common purpose doctrine, given the prosecution’s 
positive submission and President William Webb’s supportive view? The underlying flaw 
that joint enterprise was neither a general principle nor an international custom, had not 
bothered them in respect of the inchoate conspiracy. Moreover, the prosecution’s and 
Webb’s views were entirely consistent with the common law and the Tokyo Charter. It 
may be that the Majority foresaw the dangers for due process of group guilt and 
convictions based on passive association rather than positive conduct and recoiled from 
the full extent of acceptance of the doctrine.57  Moreover, it would have exposed the 
weakness of their factual finding of the existence of the conspiracy if they were then to 
hang a number of convictions for waging different wars on that finding. But it seems 
most likely that they did not do apply it because the Indictment did not ask them to do so; 
had it done so, I believe they would have sanctioned the doctrines broader application. 
 In result the Tokyo judgment serves as a precedent for inchoate conspiracy to 
commit crimes against peace, and for a restricted interpretation of the joint enterprise 
doctrine. It is worth recalling that the Tokyo Charter serves as a broader precedent for the 
joint enterprise doctrine. Moreover, has arguably got a stronger claim to reflecting 
international law given that in Resolution 95I of 11 December 1946 the UN General 
Assembly affirmed the Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, and the 
Tokyo and Nuremberg Charters share the provision relating to the joint enterprise 
doctrine. 
 
 
12. Post-war development in respect of Joint Enterprise  
Three recent developments point to a potential rerun of the prosecution and Webb’s 
arguments for a broader view of joint enterprise:  
 As a result of strong German pressure aggression was incorporated, undefined, in 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which sets out the 
ICC’s substantive jurisdiction. Strong efforts are currently being made to achieve a 
consensus definition of the offence which can be included in Article 5 and such a 
definition appears to be promised in 2008 by the Ad-Hoc Working Group, hopefully for 
adoption by the first conference of the parties to the Rome Statute to possibly be held in 
2009. 
 The joint enterprise doctrine was revived by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Prosecutor v Tadić.58 In the absence of 
statutory authority the Appeals Chamber found authority in many post-World War II 
cases concerning war crimes.59 It classified three categories of join enterprise: the basic 
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form,60 a concentration camp form (a species of the basic form) 61 and a mob violence 
form (the parasitical form).62 The Appeals Chamber concluded that the notion is 
customary international law,63 a decision confirmed in a number of more recent decisions 
of the ICTY.64 Critics have pounced on the failure of the ICTY to show generality and 
consistency of practice and the formulation of an opinio iuris65 and have concluded that 
prior to the decision ‘this form of liability did not exist in international criminal or 
humanitarian law.’66 Koessler writing shortly after the Second World War argued, 
however, that the doctrine is within the ambits of the principle of criminal guilt generally 
recognized by all civilized systems of law.67  
 The doctrine of joint enterprise also finds expression in Article 25(3)(d) of the 
Rome Statute which provides that  
 
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: … 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such 
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of 
furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such 
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime.  
 
This provision was borrowed from the Terrorist Bombings Convention68 and according to 
Clark most of the delegates thought they were voting for the inclusion of conspiracy but 
instead they got joint enterprise! Strong efforts are currently being made to expressly 
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exclude crimes against peace from the application of Article 25(3)(d) but that has yet to 
happen. 
 
13. Conclusion 
The revival of the joint enterprise doctrine and the revival of crime of aggression may 
dovetail nicely if the largely forgotten judgment at Tokyo is re-examined by eager 
prosecutors. Joint enterprise could be used in combination with aggression to achieve the 
original US goal of holding leaders who engineer wars of aggression responsible for all 
their unlawful consequences – the concept of collective total responsibility for illegal 
wars. Is this a good idea?  
 The argument for the application of the doctrine is that those who act through 
others should be held responsible for their actions. The doctrine provides one way of 
reaching the “big fish” thought to be ultimately responsible for international crimes. 
Moreover, at a pragmatic level joint enterprise is a prosecutor’s helpmeet.  
 The arguments against the parasitical form are various. The primary objection is 
that it does not rely on the accused intending the conduct; it dilutes the mens rea 
requirement to less purposive forms of subjective fault including recklessness. Thus, for 
example, it cannot be inferred from the mere fact of that George Bush ordered the illegal 
invasion of Iraq invasion that he was party to a joint enterprise along with the 
perpetrators of the war crimes that occurred at Abu Ghraib to commit those crimes. 
Moreover, he should not be held responsible for those crimes even if he foresaw the 
possibility of some form of war crime being carried out by US military personnel 
incidental to their joint enterprise of invading Iraq. Command responsibility may provide 
otherwise but we are dealing with the incidental consequences of complicity in a primary 
charge of aggression, not a war crime.   
 There are more subtle arguments against the basic form of the doctrine, i.e. where 
the accused shares a common purpose with others to engage in aggression, but does not 
actually engage in waging a war of aggression, the waging of such a war should not be 
imputed to him:   
• Unlike ordinary accessorial liability which rests on proof that the accused assisted 
another to perform a crime, under the joint enterprise doctrine the accused is 
being held liable not for his conduct, but for the conduct of others. Criticism of 
the doctrine focuses on its dispensing with the requirement of a causal nexus 
between the accused’s actions and the criminal result or behaviour, the basis for 
attribution. If the law is going to dispense with the requirement of causation or 
participation, the law had better have a strong and clear basis for the attribution of 
liability.69 Attribution can only take place on the basis of the accused’s subjective 
consent to be bound by the acts of another, if the accused has voluntarily assumed 
responsibility for the acts of the actual perpetrator.70 Without such voluntary 
assumption the accused to whom the act is attributed is not blameworthy.  Such 
attribution can be based on express or implied agreement, but not on something 
less than that. Mere association is not good enough, as quite frequently we 
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associate ourselves with actions for which we do not wish to assume 
responsibility.71  
• I would argue that the government and military high command of a state 
comprises a situation of collective action where the basis of collectivity is 
insufficient to dispense with causation, precisely because its hierarchical nature 
means it frequently involves association rather than voluntary assumption of 
responsibility. Even if some members of this hierarchy consent to be bound by the 
actions of others, other members may not. Drawing the parameters of this consent 
may prove extremely difficult. Membership per se cannot lead to attribution 
without proof of individual commitment to aggressive actions. If a doctrine 
understands the individual in terms of the collective entity to which he belongs, 
rather than in terms of his own actions, it has no place in the criminal law.72 At 
Tokyo the prosecution submitted and the Majority of the Tribunal accepted, using 
the joint enterprise doctrine as the legal structure, the factual thesis that the 
government and military high Command could be collectively regarded as a joint 
enterprise to wage unlawful war. This limited precedent illustrates that attribution 
of guilt in virtue of membership of the government is wrong in terms of a criminal 
law wedded to methodological individualism - international criminal law is after 
all founded on the notion of individual criminal responsibility. It is arguable that 
given proof of individual voluntary assumption of responsibility for the actions of 
others, the basic form of the joint enterprise doctrine still has a role in 
international criminal law. But the problem at Tokyo was that the absence of such 
proof led the prosecution to fall back on membership. This problem of proof is 
certain to re-emerge in any future prosecution of the crime of aggression. We 
should reject the basic form of the joint enterprise doctrine if it reappears linked to 
aggression and use ordinary principles of accessorial liability, which have a much 
stronger claim to being recognised as general principles of international law, and 
which require the prosecution to establish some link between the secondary party 
and the principal’s conduct.  
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